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SALES
Implied Warranty of Fitness-Partial Reliance. In Fossum v.
Timber Structures, Inc.,' the Washington court adopted the rule that
"an implied warranty of fitness may exist even though the buyer's
reliance on the seller's skill and judgment is not a total reliance, and
the buyer has relied on his own judgment as to some matters and on
the seller as to other matters."2
It is necessary to look closely at the facts of the Fossum case to see
exactly what the present effect of this rule is on Washington law. In
1955, respondents, fruit growers in the Yakima valley, decided to
construct a fruit warehouse, the roof of which was to be supported
by "bow string" trusses. The respondents selected a general designer
to prepare plans for all parts of the building except the roof trusses.
In February of 1955, one of the respondents contacted a sales representative of appellant, explained to him the nature of the building, and
requested a price quotation for trusses which would meet their needs,
particularly in that they would be capable of withstanding any snow
load which could be expected in the Yakima area. At that time the
representative estimated that the trusses should be designed to hold
a "dead load" of seventeen pounds and a "live load" of twenty-five
pounds. Subsequently, a sales order was prepared in which the loads
were specified, the "dead load" figure being fifteen pounds. After
respondents signed the order, appellant supplied plans for the trusses
which specified a "dead load" of only ten pounds. Respondents then
presented the plans to their general designer who, upon making certain
corrections as to length and other suggestions, returned them to appellant. Upon receiving a sales change order which specified a "dead
load" of ten pounds, respondents returned it to appellant, indicating
their approval of the truss plans as corrected.3 The "live load" remained fixed at twenty-five pounds throughout the negotiations. Appellant proceeded to build and erect in place the roof trusses according
to the plans.
In January, 1956, several months after completion of the warehouse,
the roof collapsed following a heavy snow fall. Respondents brought
suit alleging, as one theory of recovery, breach of an implied warranty
1154 Wash. Dec. 395, 341 P.2d 157 (1959).
2

Id. at 413.

Actually, this reduction in "dead load" should not have played a role in the collapse of the roof, for "dead load" is the permanent load or weight of the roof and
anything suspended therefrom. The snow load would be considered "live load," which
consists of any weight temporarily added to the roof.
3
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of fitness for a particular purpose. The defendant appealed the unfavorable jury verdict, contending, among other things, that the trial
court should have found, as a matter of law, respondents, by submitting the plans with the specified load factors to their designer for
approval, did not rely on appellant's skill or judgment in making the
purchase.
In reaching its decision on this issue, the court first said: "From the
evidence, the jury could have believed that, in showing the truss plans
to Sanford [respondent's general designer], respondents were merely
assuring themselves that the trusses would fit in with the over-all
construction of the warehouse."' The court then announced the partial
versus total reliance rule set forth above and cited one Iowa case' as
authority. Perhaps no severe criticism should be leveled at the summary adoption of this rule, since it overrules no prior Washington law.
It is new law, however, at least to the extent it means that where a
purchaser has his own expert inspect the specifications for the goods
to be purchased, it is still possible for a jury to find that the purchaser
relied on the seller's judgment that the goods would be suitable for the
buyer's particular purpose. Viewed in the light of the facts of the
Fossum case, the rule is not startling. For the roof trusses in question to
have been reasonably suitable for the purpose described to appellant, it
would have been necessary for them to fit, physically, the rest of the
building. Secondly, the trusses must have been capable of supporting
the roof when covered with snow. It is entirely reasonable that reliance by the purchaser on the skill or judgment of the appeallant as to
the existence of either of these characteristics should give rise to an
implied warranty of suitability, for the absence of either would mean
that the trusses were in fact not suitable.
If the rule is applied only to cases which fit the fact pattern of the
Fossumn case, total reliance on the seller's skill or judgment as to the
existence of at least one of the necessary qualities is still a prerequisite
to the implied warranty. The wording of the rule itself indicates that
it will be so limited. Such limitation would mean that the rule will not
be extremely difficult for a jury to apply. It also would not introduce
a factor which would make prediction of outcome entirely impossible
for the attorney. However, the fact patterns of the Iowa case cited
by the court and of other cases in which courts have stated the rule
in exactly the same words, were such as to indicate that courts have
4 154 Wash. Dec. 395, 413, 341 P.2d 157, 168 (1959).
5Drager v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., 244 Iowa 78, 56 N.W.2d 18 (1952).
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applied the rule where the reliance as to the existence of a single
quality was divided. At least the facts of those cases as reported do
not show that the desired qualities were susceptible of being broken
down into several separate qualities with separate reliance on each
quality, as are those of the Fossum case. 6 If this is the case, it is to
be hoped that the Washington court has recognized and will maintain
the distinction. If the rule is extended to the second type of fact
situation, the finder of fact is faced with the very difficult decision as
to when the reliance of the buyer on the skill or judgment of the seller
sufficiently outweighs the buyer's reliance on his own judgment to give
rise to the implied warranty.
6 The rule seems to have originated in Kurriss v. Conrad & Co., 312 Mass. 670, 46
N.E2d 12 (1942). The Massachusetts court discussed Flynn v. Bedell Co., 242 Mass.
450, 136 N.E. 252 (1922), a case in which the buyer had participated to some extent
in selecting a coat with a fur collar. Since the court had said that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant a jury finding that the buyer relied on the seller's skill and judgment that the fur was natural rather than dyed, the court in the Kurriss case concluded
the earlier court meant that reliance under the Uniform Sales Act need not be total
reliance and that the buyer may rely on his own judgment as to some matters and on
the skill or judgment of the seller as to others. The Flynn case had the same type of
fact pattern as the Fossum case in that the qualities on which there was a different
source of reliance were easily separated. In the Kurriss case itself, the buyer purchased
a dress selected by the seller. The reliance was not total in that the buyer tried the
the dress on and, therefore, to some extent, participated in the selection. However,
trying the dress on only indicated reliance on the buyer's own judgment as to matters
pertaining to the fit of the dress and not as to whether the dress was unsafe for any
reason. The court allowed a recovery for skin irritation caused by some latent defect
in the dress.
In Drager v. Carlson Hybrid Corn Co., supra note 5, the purchaser bought hybrid
seed corn from the seller. The Iowa court said that the trial court granted a directed
verdict for the seller on the bases of lack of proof as to (1) the measure of damages
and (2) reliance by the buyer on the seller's skill or judgment. The appellant had
bought such seed corn from the same seller for several years and, therefore, to some
extent, relied on his own judgment that corn purchased from the seller would be suitable. Also, the sales contract reserved to the buyer the right to reject any or all of the
crop if it did not qualify, further indicating that the buyer was relying on his own
judgment. Without specifying as to what matters the buyer relied on his own judgment and as to what matters he relied on the skill or judgment of the seller, the Iowa
appellate court, in reversing the lower court, applied the same partial versus total
reliance rule stated by the Washington court in the Fossum case.
In Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Iowa 1958), the federal
court quoted the rule from the Drager case. The buyer had purchased a corn storage
bin after making known to the seller the exact purposes for which he wished to use it.
However, he had, prior to the purchase, visited a neighboring farm where such a bin
was installed, in an attempt to ascertain whether the product was what he wanted. The
court applied the partial reliance rule and allowed recovery for breach of warranty
even though the buyer had partially relied on his own judgment on the very matters
which the court found gave rise to the implied warranty.
Himmelstein v. Budner, 93 F. Supp. 946 (D.C. D.C. 1950), was another case in
which the matters for which the buyer relied on his own judgment were clearly distinguishable from those for which the seller's skill or judgment were relied on. This case
was cited for the partial reliance rule in Hagedorn v. Taggart, 114 A.2d 430 (Munic.
Ct. of Appeals D.C. 1955). There, a lady who had worn hearing aids for several years
purchased a new one, partially relying on her own experience and judgment and
partially relying on the skill and judgment of the seller. Once again the rule was
applied to the fact situation in which it is difficult to see a separation of reliance
corresponding to a separation of necessary characteristics of the merchandise.
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Another contention of appellant was that the specification of load
factors in the plans constituted an express warranty that the trusses
would withstand the specified loads, that such warranty would be
inconsistent with an implied warranty that the trusses would withstand any greater load, and that therefore, under RCW 63.04.160 (6),'
the latter warranty did not arise. In answering this argument, the
Washington court quite correctly pointed out that such an express
warranty was not inconsistent with an implied warranty that such
load factors would produce trusses suitable for respondent's purpose,
that is, trusses capable of withstanding any snow load which could be
expected in the Yakima area. As authority for this proposition the
court cited Long v. The Five-Hundred Co.8 However, that case was
not one in which a purchase order containing the specifications for the
merchandise was signed by the purchaser. The facts of the Fossum
case are more nearly like those of United States Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Co. v. Ellis," which was discussed and distinguished in the
Long case. The sales contract in the Long case specified a particular
Day-Elder auto truck. The contract signed by the parties in the Ellis
case specified the type and size of cast iron pipe being purchased. In
both cases the seller had been informed of the buyer's particular use
for the goods being purchased. An implied warranty was held to arise
in the former case but not in the latter. The cases may be distinguished
by looking at the negotiations leading to the contract in each case. In
the Long case the seller, upon hearing of the buyer's need, presented
the particular truck and represented that it was suitable for the buyer's
purpose. In the Ellis case the buyer himself had attached to the order
the contract under which he was working, which contained detailed
specifications as to the type of pipe to be used. Although the facts of
the Fossum case seem to coincide more nearly with those of the Ellis
case than with those of the Long case, the distinction made above, as
to which party furnished the description or specifications, when applied to the facts of the Fossum case, clearly places the Fossum case
in the Long case category. Actually, the rules stated in the Ellis case
clearly require the decision reached in both the Long and Fossum
cases. 10 In this respect the Fossum case does not alter any existing
7
"An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition
implied under this chapter unless inconsistent therewith."
8 123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (1923).
9 117 Wash. 601, 201 Pac. 900 (1921).
10 "[I]t is perhaps the general rule, that where a buyer orders a specific article from
a dealer or manufacturer, stating the purpose for which the article is intended to be
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law but does indicate the extent to which the Ellis rules will be applied.
It is to be hoped that any future Washington decisions in this area
will contain an analysis in terms of these rules.
JOHN F. COLGROVE
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS
Security Transactions - Purchase-money Mortgages, Mechanic's
Lien - Priorities. On occasion, a real estate contract vendee will have
a mechanic or materialman perform work or furnish materials prior to
the vendee's receiving record title in the property. The vendee may
also grant a purchase-money mortgage on the same property. The
purpose of this Casenote is to consider the priorities between the purchase-money mortgage and the mechanic's or material-man's lien in
Washington. The matter has again been raised in the recent decision
of Nelson v. Bailey.'
The mechanic's lien attaches, at the time the work is performed, to
the interest in the land of the person who caused the work to be done.2
If the person for whom work is performed has less than the fee, the
lien will not ordinarily attach to the fee. For example, in the case of a
mechanic or materialman who performs services for a lessee who is
authorized by the terms of the lease to build, the lien attaches only
to the lessee's interest and does not attach to the lessor's fee.3 The
Washington court in the lease case rejected an argument that the
lessee was the agent of the lessor.' In the case of Newell v. Vervaeke'
used, and trusts to the judgment of the seller the selection of the article which shall be
suitable for the intended purpose, there is an implied warranty that the article furnished
shall be reasonably fit for the intended purpose. . . . But the converse of the proposition is equally the rule, namely, that when the article ordered is to be manufactured
according to certain prescribed specifications, or is an article well known and defined
in current trade, the contract is complied with when an article is furnished which is
manufactured in accordance with the designated specifications, or is an article of the
standard kind known to the trade, even though the seller may know the purposes for
which it is intended to be used and it afterwards proves to be unfit or unsitable for the
intended purpose." Id. at 605-06.
1154 Wash. Dec. 153, 333 P.2d 757 (1959).
2 RCW 60.04.030.
3 Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619, 59 Pac. 507 (1899) ; Colby & Dickinson, Inc. v. Baker, 145 Wash. 584, 261 Pac. 161 (1927).
4 See note 3, supra; however, in Seattle Lighting Fixture Co. v. Broadway Cent.
Market, 156 Wash. 189, 286 Pac. 43 (1930), the court held that a mechanic's lien did
attach to the fee of the lessor in a lease which by its terms required the lessee to build.
5 189 Wash. 144, 63 P.2d 488 (1937). See also, Baker v. Sinclaire, 22 Wash. 462,
61 Pac. 170 (1900). A recorded conditional sale contract with forfeiture clause will
prevent the lien from attaching to the fee, Mentzer v. Peters, 64 Wash. 540, 33 Pac.
1078 (1893) ; Iliff v. Forssell, 7 Wash. 225, 34 Pac. 928 (1893), even if the conditional
sale contract requires that work be performed, Northwest Bridge Co. v. Tacoma Shipbuilding Co., 36 Wash. 333, 78 Pac. 996 (1904).

